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This paper studies the design of indirect redistributive taxation and of corrective taxation, as 
well as the formation of equilibrium indirect tax policies via a  political process, in the 
presence of status goods, allowing for the possibility that illegal copies of those goods may be 
purchased on black markets (the phenomenon of "piracy"). Heavy taxation of status goods, 
despite the fact these are typically overconsumed, is not particularly favoured in a social 
welfare maximisation context, because the tax rate is highly distortionary, due to the presence 
of piracy. Corrective taxation, aimed at  remedying the inefficiencies associated with the 
consumption externalities generated by the status goods, is made ineffective by piracy. In 
contrast with the normative results, the median voter model predicts an inefficiently large tax 
rate on status goods when piracy is widespread. 
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January 6, 2012 I. Introduction
This paper is placed at the crossroads between two branches of the economic literature, one dealing
with taxation in the presence of shadow markets, and the other dealing with the production and
marketing of illegal copies ("piracy"). While relying on both streams of work, it purports at the
same time to introduce a new perspective.
On the one hand, the focus in taxation studies has been, since the seminal paper by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972), in very general terms on the coexistence of a standard sector and an irregular
one, whose activity is outside the realm of tax policy.1 On the other hand, virtually the whole recent
literature on piracy (e.g. Peitz and Waelbroeck 2003) is devoted to the issue of digital copies, and
the focus is mostly on how society at large or even the legitimate producers might conceivably gain,
rather than lose, from piracy.
This paper considers a well-de￿ned illegal sector, thereby di⁄erentiating itself from the generalist
approach of most tax models, but does not focus on digital copies, rather on the reproduction of
fashion goods, taking therefore a di⁄erent view from the majority of piracy studies (an exception
is the paper by El Harbi and Grolleau 2008, that deals exactly with the piracy of high-end fashion
items but ignores tax issues). The illegal fashion market is believed to have peculiarities that matter
for tax design, with speci￿c reference to the indirect taxation of luxury versus non-luxury goods.
The paper also tackles speci￿cally the question whether piracy impacts on the e⁄ectiveness of the
tax system, both in terms of e¢ ciency and of equity.
The reason why I have chosen to investigate the faking of fashion items rather than of CDs,
DVDs and software is that, while both illegal markets are huge2 and thus deserve our attention, the
former is less well-known and has some peculiarities arising from the fact that modish, trendy goods
can be seen as conveying information on the status of their owner. More precisely, they might be
what Hirsh (1976) has called "positional" goods, commodities whose consumption matters only or
mostly in relative terms: they signal, by their relative abundance, the status of those who consume
1In this respect, the theoretical problems are similar to those faced when studying taxation in the presence of
household production, which may be regular but is nevertheless hard to tax. The seminal work in this area is Sandmo
(1990).
2According to the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, a branch of the International Chamber of Commerce, about
10% of all trade concerns fakes. The largest markets are Corea, Taiwan and Italy, in decreasing order of magnitude.
Taking Italy as an example, we ￿nd that the total value of the faked goods is roughly estimated at 7 billion euros
per year; clothes and apparel account for 36,7% of this value, while the corresponding ￿gure for digital copies is 23%
(Penelope, 2011).
2them. A string of interesting and innovative papers on status e⁄ects has appeared over the years in
top journals such as AER, JPE and JPubE (e.g. Frank 1984, Glazer and Konrad 1991, Konrad and
Lommerud 1993, Bernheim 1994, Bagwell and Bernheim 1996, Clark and Oswald 1998, Dupor and
Liu 2003), accompanied by equally well-published empirical con￿rmations of the relevance of the
phenomenon (e.g. Solnick and Hemenway 1998 and 2005, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005) and applications
to public ￿nance (e.g. Boskin and Sheshinski 1978, Ireland 1994 and 2001, Corneo and Jeanne 1998,
Corneo and Gruner 2000, Corneo 2002, Micheletto 2008 and 2009).3 There is also a small literature
that deals speci￿cally with tax dodging in the presence of relative consumption e⁄ects, although
the focus is on income taxation (see e.g. Balestrino 2009 and Goerke 2011). However, the approach
is still liable to be judged unorthodox, and for this reason, I will propose in the next section a
defence of the chosen characterisation of luxury goods as status-signalling ones. For now, I wish to
explain why such a characterisation might impact on the design of indirect taxes.
The above-mentioned peculiarities are two. First, the fact that the agents care for relative,
as opposed to absolute, consumption breaks the link between competitive markets and e¢ ciency,
as it induces a "consumption externality" normally leading to overconsumption (Dupor and Liu
2003). Clearly, this must be accounted for in the tax design; and several studies among those cited
above have already dealt with some aspects of this issue, especially Corneo and Jeanne 1998 and
Micheletto 2008 (the other contributions in public ￿nance are prevalently concerned with income
taxation). Second, the reason why fashion goods are so often faked is exactly that they have
mostly a signalling value: nothing of this sort can happen to ordinary, non-status goods. One
cannot counterfeit milk in any meaningful sense of the word ￿the nutritive properties of milk are
needed by our bodies, and adding melamine to "fake" its protein content isn￿ t going to work.4
But one can easily counterfeit a MiuMiu purse, since all it takes is to manufacture something that
looks like a MiuMiu purse ￿both the genuine article and the fake can then be used in the same
way.5 Being marketed outside the legal markets, fakes cannot be the object of tax policy, but their
3The list, impressive as it might be, is far from being complete: see Truyts (2008) for a much more comprehensive
bibliography.
4In 2008, China￿ s health ministry declared that "almost 300,000 babies were taken ill due to contaminated milk
powder" that year. The contaminant was melamine and "the crisis caused public outrage because it is thought the
chemical was added deliberately to allow substandard milk to pass nutrition tests" (Bratigan, 2008).
5The logic behind digital copies is di⁄erent. The enormous spread of this practice can be attributed to technical
factors that have reduced the costs of copying, including the risk of being caught, to almost zero. Digital copying
technologies are very cheap, easy to use and widely available: a large share of the illegal copies are actually made by
3presence alters its e⁄ects. The analysis of the speci￿c interaction between this illegal market and
the design of taxes is the major contribution of the present paper.
Moreover, although the paper does not dwell especially on the question whether the presence
of pirates a⁄ects the welfare of the consumers and of the regular producers, it must of course touch
upon this. For example, a standard argument in defence of illegal markets (normally advanced
in the context of digital copies, see again Peitz and Waelbroeck 2003) is that the availability of
cheaper alternatives must at the very least be good in terms of increased consumer welfare, so that
pro￿t losses from the industry might be partially or totally compensated. However, in the present
model it is possible to make a more general argument inasmuch as it considers also whether these
markets prevent tax policy from displaying its redistributive e⁄ects or actually enhance them. This
sort of reasoning is possible because the focus of the analysis has been shifted away from general
welfare e⁄ects and towards tax issues.
I shall proceed as follows. Section II describes the type of status-seeking behaviour that I
have in mind. Section III sets up the model. Section IV analyses the design of optimal policy
as well as its e⁄ects, and the way in which they are in￿ uenced by the existence of fake status
goods; it also includes, for completeness, a discussion of the tax policy that might emerge from a
political competition process. There is, interestingly, a certain amount of discrepancy between the
normative and the positive analysis: the former does not allow to make a strong case for heavy
taxation of status goods, but the latter predicts a larger than optimal tax rate. Section V concludes
by summarising the main results.
II. Status e⁄ects: a defense and a characterisation
It is well-known that economics emphasises status as a motivation of human behaviour less than
the other social sciences, despite the fact that one of the early studies on the subject was conducted
by an economist (Veblen 1899).6 Up to 1940s one could ￿nd instances of major explanations of
economic phenomena by leading researchers that accounted for status concerns, such as the relative
income hypothesis (Duesenberry 1949). From the 1950s onward, with the rise of positive economics,
end-users, and are not sold, but lent for further copying or traded in peer-to-peer networks (Peitz and Waelbroeck
2003). Moreover, there is no or little social disapproval of this habit (see Balestrino 2008 for a theoretical argument
and Wang and McClung 2012 for an empirical con￿rmation).
6Today we would regard the work of Veblen more as belonging to the ￿eld of economic anthropology. But that
might the fruit of a bias on our part, the outcome of a separation between economics and the other social sciences to
which we are now used, but that was much less meaningful in Veblen￿ s time.
4this has become increasingly rare: a consensus seems to have been reached that assuming an interest
in status would clash with the orthodox view of the economic agent as a rational utility maximiser.
Also after Hirsh (1976) re-acquainted forcefully the economists with the subject, and despite the
sustained stream of high-brow publications cited in the Introduction, it would still be fair to claim, I
believe, that positional concerns have not yet gained (or re-gained) mainstream status in economics.
Therefore, I feel obliged to argue in their favour from what I hope is a simple but convincing point
of view. I must clarify at the outset that what I wish to make is a rather restricted methodological
point. I do not wish to dispute the assumption that the economic agent is a rational maximiser of
self-interest with stable preferences,7 but I wish to point out that there are good reasons to broaden
the view of what actually constitutes the self-interest of the individual. In this sense, I propose
to see the inclusion of positional concerns into the preferences of economic agents as a challenge
for standard economic reasoning only in the positive sense of the word, that is as an incentive to
enlarge its reach and scope.
Traditionally, economists have focused on the consumption of marketed goods and services, and
have therefore thought of the economic agent as interested in income as a form of entitlement to
those commodities. What the proponents of status studies in economics are, implicitly or explicitly,
arguing, is that status is a form of entitlement to non-marketable goods and services such as mates,
and acts also as a facilitator for market transactions, especially those in which reciprocal trust
among the parties is of essence. A frequently invoked argument is that the desire to attain and
maintain status is hard-wired in the human brain for evolutionary reasons. Given that status
guarantees easier access to goods and services, especially but not exclusively non-marketable ones,
it is likely to be crucial to the survival of the individual in times of scarcity (Postlewaite 1998,
Frank 2007). Moreover, status search implies imitative behaviour and therefore biases the agent
toward following his peers rather than always deciding on his or her own; this limits the recourse to
his or her imperfect cognitive skills (Samuelson 2004). Or, even more radically, it might be argued
in very general terms that the fact that "the individual is mainly concerned not with his absolute
level of success, but rather with the di⁄erence between his success and a benchmark that changes
over time ... can be evolutionarily advantageous in the sense of improving the individual￿ s ability
to propagate his genes" (Rayo and Becker 2007, p. 303). The conclusion is that a concern for
7I am therefore taking what Bronk (2009, ch. 9) calls a "thick" version of the rationality assumption, i.e. I am not
"thinning" the view of the economic agent as a self-interest maximizer by allowing for a wider content of preferences.
As many have argued (e.g. Frank 1988, Green and Shapiro 1994 and Bronk 2009) this would make the rationality
assumption lose its bite: ex-post, everything could be considered "rational".
5status must have been naturally selected over the ages: on this basis, it is only natural to include
it in a standard preference representation. The strength of the argument lies, it seems to me, in
the fact that it plays exactly the chords to which economists are more sensitive: a rational agent
who maximises her self-interest must, given her very nature, be able to take into account all the
possible sources of entitlement to utility-yielding goods.
Against this view one could argue that status, being more relevant for non-marketable goods,
was much more important in the past, when economies weren￿ t as fully monetised as they are now;
so, even granting that the evolutionary argument is right, it must have mostly an historical value,
and we are not losing much by assuming it away. In fact, the claim that status has by now lost much
of its relevance is not self-evident; but, even if it were correct, it needs not have the consequence
that people do not care about status anymore, indeed it cannot have it if we follow the evolutionary
argument correctly. Postlewaite (1998) notices that hard-wired traits are not necessarily cancelled
even if their evolutionary importance has diminished as long as they are not directly harmful in
the changed environment, and this is an important part of the reply. But one can go deeper, and
remark that the time scale of natural selection is enormous, and a few centuries cannot make any
di⁄erence. Indeed, most of the living animals we observe today, including us human beings, are
"very probably out of date, built under the in￿ uences of genes that were selected in some earlier era
when conditions were di⁄erent" (Dawkins, 1982, ch. 3). Time lags are a common feature of evolution
by natural selection: for example, "since modern man has drastically changed the environment of
many animals and plants over a time-scale that is negligible by ordinary evolutionary standards,
we can expect to see anachronistic adaptations rather often. The hedgehog antipredator response
of rolling up into a ball is sadly inadequate against motor cars" (ibid.). The critique, within the
evolutionary logic, has no bite.
In the conventional models in which income is the only source of entitlement, one can study
the formation of income. Just as one is interested in the actions taken by the agent to determine
her own income, one might be interested in studying how she can manage her status. This paper
focuses on the acts by which the agent tries to achieve and maintain a certain status, in particular
the use of status-signalling goods. A question that I do not take up is how a good becomes a carrier
of status; I simply suppose, as is in fact easy to verify even by casual observation, that in any given
time and place there is a subset of marketed goods that play this role, clearly recognised by all
members of the society (indeed, if it weren￿ t widely known that a good carries status, it could not,
in fact, carry status: the nature of the good is de￿ned in the relationship among the agents, just
6as words have a meaning only because we all agree to give it to them).
It must also be said that there are many ways in which an individual may try to establish and
maintain his or her status, and there are many fronts on which he or she has to wage the status
war: family relations, neighbours, colleagues, fellow commuters, etc. I￿ ll try to circumscribe a
variety of status-seeking attitude that seems most relevant to my purposes here. Broadly speaking,
one might identify two main warfare typologies, that one may label "strategic" and "atomistic".
Strategic status-seeking behaviour occurs when the competitors are few and well-known to each
other; atomistic behaviour arises instead when the agent is preoccupied with keeping up his or her
status against the public at large.
Of course, the distinction may be exaggerated: most likely, each individual competes simul-
taneously at both the strategic and the atomistic level, and the same item may serve, at least
sometimes, on both fronts. But, analytically, it is easier to understand the implications of policy
if we keep the distinction in mind, arti￿cial as it might be. Indeed, it is much easier to de￿ne the
object of policy for atomistic settings than for strategic ones. For example, in a small town, it
may be agreed upon that shopping for clothes at a given store is a sure sign of status. In that
case, an important signal will be the shopping bag with the store￿ s name on it, and each lady
will be conscious of impressing her hometown rivals by walking around with one of those bags:
clearly, a strategic situation, in which there is little scope for policy intervention. On the other
hand, there are goods that are widely recognised as carrying status in general situations, such as
those identi￿able as coming from certain luxury brands. Purchasing in a given store is a speci￿c
signal, but wearing Louboutin pumps, easily recognizable by their trademark red soles, or Louis
Vuitton bags, with the LV monogram clearly, if tastefully, in sight, is a wide-range signal, aimed at
nobody in particular and everybody in general. In those cases, it may be possible for consumers
and policy-makers alike to identify a subset of goods ￿the agreed-upon status-signalling goods ￿
that could in principle require special tax treatment. It is therefore to this sort of atomistic status
competition that I turn my attention now.
III. The model
Consider then an economy with a continuum of consumers distinguished by their income y; let
f (y) ￿ 0 be the frequency density function with support [y￿;y+] and let
R y+
y￿ f (y)dy = 1:
7There are two available commodities: a status good a, and a general consumption good c, both
normal, and both produced by constant returns to scale competitive industries in which labour
is the only input. Production prices are p for the status good and 1 (as a normalization) for the
consumption good; the latter is also taken to be untaxed (as an independent normalization), while
the former bears a speci￿c tax rate t. The need for status may be satis￿ed also by purchasing a fake
b, produced in an industry with the same characteristics as the one producing the genuine article,8
and available at some price q < p. Further, we will assume that there is some extra-cost attached
to the purchase of the fake, be that the bad conscience of doing something illegal, the fear of being
exposed wearing a fake, the uncertainty about the quality of the product, or a mix of them. Such
a cost might be wholly idiosyncratic, or might depend in some systematic way upon income: for
example, high-income agents might fear more than low-income ones the reputational consequences
of being caught making an illegal purchase or of being discovered by their relative or friends (their
signi￿cant others) or they might be more quality-conscious.







+ v (c ￿ bz (y)); (1)
where r is the reference level of consumption of the status good, so that (a + b)=r is relative
consumption. I suppose that r depends positively on the absolute consumption levels of all agents,
but I dot not characterise it further. The crucial assumption motivating the analysis that follow is
that, being in an atomistic setting, the agent ignores the impact that his or her own consumption of
a or b has on the reference point r. This is the source of the ine¢ ciency-generating "consumption
externality", as I will demonstrate later on by comparing the market outcome with the one that
would be generated by an omniscient social planner, aware of the economy-wide implications of each
agent￿ s choice.9 On the basis of the argument given in fn. 8, I take a and b to be perfect substitutes,
8In fact, it might even be the same industry: some "fakes" are actually the real thing without the label or certi￿cate
attesting its authenticity. This is possible because fashion brands do not control their production in-house, but hire
external factories whose workers can then also produce counterfeited items on the side (Varese 2011). In turn, this
implies that the quality of the fake need not be inferior to that of the original, although it might be perceived so, at
least when the agent has no means to ascertain this directly.
9To be precise, the ine¢ ciency arises when the relative consumption e⁄ect is not uniform across goods; indeed, in
our case, one of the goods has no relative consumption e⁄ect at all. Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) use this property
in their discussion of the conditions under which the presence of consumption externalities is compatible with overall
e¢ ciency. What evidence we have is however against the uniformity of positional concerns (Solnick and Hemenway
8but I also embed the loss inherent to the uncertainty about this, and other cost elements, in a per-
unit cost function z (y), expressed in units of the numeraire, independent of the purchased quantity
of b and strictly convex in the agent￿ s income. The sub-utility functions u(￿) and v (￿) are strictly
concave and increasing; moreover, the elasticity of the marginal utility of relative consumption
(a + b)=r is taken to be larger than unity, which ensures "following behaviour" on the consumer￿ s
part, i.e. a desire to acquire more of a or b is r rises ￿see Clark and Oswald (1998). This is
indeed what one would expect for status goods; the utility function however allows also for the
"deviant behaviour" of snob agents who prefer less of a good as the reference level increases (when
the elasticity of u0 is less than unity), although I will not discuss that case here.
Once the budget constraint is de￿ned as
(p + t)a + qb + c = y + T; (2)
where a lump-sum subsidy T > 0 (tax if T < 0) has been introduced, one can describe the agent￿ s
equilibrium. Solving eq. (2) for c and substituting it in the utility function, one obtains a new









v0 ￿ q + z (y); (3)
plus complementary slackness. Perfect substitutability implies a corner solution: an agent will
purchase no a as long as p+t exceeds q+z (y), and no b in the opposite case. When the "adjusted"
price q + z (y) is increasing in y (z0 > 0), it is easy to identify a threshold income y, implicitly
de￿ned by
p + t = q + z (y); (4)
such that all agents with income above y will purchase exclusively a while all agents with income
below y will purchase exclusively b (the agents whose income is exactly y have an indeterminate
consumption mix, and one can assign them without loss of generality to either group ￿say those
who purchase a). This is plausible: high income consumers go for the real thing, while the relatively
poorer ones buy the fake. The cut-o⁄ income depends on policy, because if t increases, there will





￿z0 > 0; (5)
1998, 2005).
9where the sign follows from our restriction that z0 > 0. The lowest cut-o⁄ income obtains in
laissez-faire, when t = 0; as taxation is introduced, the threshold will go up.
Turning back to the agent￿ s problem, one ￿nds that the solution yields the demand functions
b(q + z (y);y + T); y < y (t) and a(p + t;y + T); y ￿ y (t). Substituting the demands back into
the utility function, one obtains the indirect utility functions, in which I emphasize the role of the
tax instruments
W (T;y); y < y (t); V (t;T;y); y ￿ y (t): (6)
It is immediate to see that
@W
@T
= v0 (c ￿ bz (y)) < 0; y < y (t);
@V
@t
= ￿a < 0;
@V
@T
= v0 (c) < 0; y ￿ y (t); (7)
where all the demands are evaluated at the optimum.
Moving now to the case of the omniscient planner, one notices that, knowing that each individual
choice a⁄ects r; such a planner would solve the maximisation problem di⁄erently, and lead the agent
to an equilibrium characterised by the following FOCs (to be evaluated at t = 0):
1
r





(1 ￿ ￿ (y))
u0
v0 ￿ q + z (y); (8)
again plus complementary slackness. The key elements here is the elasticity of the reference level





@ (a(y) + b(y))
: (9)
This elasticity is positive (by the assumption that r is increasing in a(y) + b(y) for all y) and can
plausibly be taken to be less then unity for all agents. Hence, the comparison between the planner￿ s
FOCs (8) and the ones prevailing in laissez-faire, that is eq. (3) evaluated at t = 0, shows that in
the latter case there is overconsumption of the status good: the marginal bene￿t curve is shifted
to the right relative to the e¢ cient situation.
The threshold income in the planned economy is the same as in the laissez-faire one. Also, it
is possible to identify the indirect utility functions, and the e⁄ects that the policy tools have on
them, in the usual way; we use an asterisk to avoid confusion with the market equilibrium case:
W￿ (T;y); y < y (t); V ￿ (t;T;y); y ￿ y (t): (10)
@W￿
@T
= v0 (c￿ ￿ b￿z (y)) < 0; y < y (t);
@V ￿
@t
= ￿a￿ < 0;
@V ￿
@T
= v0 (c￿) < 0 y ￿ y (t): (11)
The discrepancy between the market outcome and the e¢ cient equilibrium establishes an im-
mediate case for policy action in the form e.g. of corrective taxation in the Pigouvian tradition.
10But, one might want to consider broader forms of intervention, such as those arising when the gov-
ernment maximises a quasi-concave social welfare function, thereby balancing e¢ ciency and equity
objectives. Also, one might like to check the characteristics of the policy arising from a political
competition process, e.g. following the standard median voter approach.
IV. Policy analysis
To begin with, let us emphasize again that we are only focusing here on tax policy. The presence
of fakes will of course solicit on the government￿ s part some action against those who trade in the
shadow market: in principle, the psychic cost of buying a fake, z; may depend on the enforcement
of appropriate rules. For the purpose of our analysis here, we consider that sort of intervention
as exogenous, although we will comment on the role that the enforcement of rules against illicit
trade practices may take in coadiuvating tax policy and viceversa; in those instances, we might for
example consider the impact of an exogenous change in the value of z.
First, I will consider a purely Pigouvian corrective policy, both in ￿rst-best economies in which
the government has all the information that it may need, and in second-best ones, where there is
not complete information. Next, we study welfarist optimal policies, only in second-best economies.
Finally, we consider the political equilibrium policies.
Corrective policy
If the government is simply interested in a Pigouvian corrective policy, then it might think of
calibrating t so as to match the value taken by the elasticity of the reference level w.r.t. the
individual purchase of a by the agent. Normally, this policy would lead to a complete elimination
of the externalities in a ￿rst-best setting where the omniscient planner can compute ￿ (y) for every
y; in a more realistic second-best setting where this is not possible, the policy would remedy the
ine¢ ciency only partially. In the present framework, there is the additional di¢ cult that the market
in which fakes are traded falls outside the scope of tax policy.
Consider a ￿rst-best economy, and suppose that the planner not only knows everything con-
cerning each agent, but can also costlessly eradicate the illegal market (can drive z to such a
large value that y = y￿, hence b(y) = 0; 8y). Rewrite the FOC for a in an e¢ cient setting as
u0=v0r ￿ p=(1 ￿ ￿ (y)); then it easy to see that a ￿rst-best corrective tax can be established by
solving p=(1 ￿ ￿ (y)) = p + t for each agent. This yields
b t(y) = p
￿ (y)
(1 ￿ ￿ (y))
> 0; 8y (12)
11where the hat denotes the Pigouvian tax, and the tax rate is income-speci￿c (recall that we took
￿ to be positive and less than unity for all agents). By imposing this array of corrective taxes, the
government e⁄ectively remedies the ine¢ ciency.
Things are however far from being so smooth in second-best. In order to highlight the e⁄ects
of the market for fakes, let me simplify the task of the government by assuming that ￿ (y) is the
same across agents, and it is also constant as a changes. Denote this common and ￿xed value as
￿ 2 (0;1); the Pigouvian tax is then simply
b t = p
￿
1 ￿ ￿
> 0; 8y: (13)
But now agents can switch between the legal market and the one for fakes as they like, because
in second-best the government cannot costlessly enforce the rules against the latter. Then, if we
compare the level of the threshold income y after the introduction of the tax with the level prevailing
in laissez-faire, we ￿nd that such a level has gone up as the tax has gone from 0 to some positive
value ￿see eq. (5). Those agents who still purchase a will now behave e¢ ciently, but of course
those who purchase b, and there are more of them than before, continue to buy an ine¢ ciently large
amount.
On the whole then, corrective tax policy is ine⁄ective as far as e¢ ciency is concerned, unless the
government can wipe out the whole black market. This represents an argument for the enforcement
of rules against fakes that might be overlooked if tax issues were not considered: such rules might
indeed improve the capability of the tax system to remedy the ine¢ cient behaviour of the agents.
Welfarist policy
The government￿ s objective is to maximise a social welfare function, which I take to be a weighted
sum of the individual utilities (generalised utilitarianism). Since the government is also aware of
the consumption externalities it will however employ as arguments in the social welfare function the
"corrected" indirect utilities (10) rather than the ones that actually re￿ ect the agents behaviour.10
This way, the optimal policy will re￿ ect three concerns: equity, e¢ ciency in the standard sense of
limiting the tax distortions and e¢ ciency in the sense of correcting the externality. Social welfare
is then given by
Z y(t)
y￿
w(y)V ￿ (T;y)f (y)dy +
Z y+
y(t)
w(y)V ￿ (t;T;y)f (y)dy; (14)
10A general discussion of taxation when the government has not the same preferences as the agents is to be found
in Blomquist and Micheletto (2006).
12where w(y) > 0 are the welfare weights; to ensure that the government pursues an equity-oriented





a(t;T;y)f (y)dy = T; (15)
where no exogenous revenue requirement is assumed to exist. The optimal indirect tax system is
then simply found by maximising (14) subject to (15).
At the core of this policy problem there is a standard multi-person Ramsey tax problem, with
an extra-element to take into account: the number of those who actually purchase the taxed good is
endogenous, as it depends on the very tax rate that is to be established. There is also the additional
complication that the government wants to employ the tax not only for equity purposes, but also
for corrective reasons. The solution procedure is however a simple variant of the standard one, to

























v0 (c￿ (y) ￿ b￿ (y)z (y))f (y)dy +
Z y+
y(t)






(y)f (y)dy = 0; (17)
where L denotes the Lagrangian and ￿ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. Now, the required steps are















g (y)f (y)dy (20)
11The fact that we took the welfare weights to be decreasing in income reinforces the possibility that g (y) is also
decreasing in income. The presence of a revenue term in the de￿nition of g (y) makes however impossible to establish
this without actually assuming it. Such an assumption is standard in the public ￿nance literature and motivated by
the fact that the revenue term includes an income e⁄ect that is presumably negligible.
13as the social net marginal utility of income aggregated/averaged over those who purchase a; second,
add and subtract A to and from the ￿rst term in the FOC (16) so as to account for the discrepancy
between the actual and the optimal consumption of a; third, apply the Slutsky decomposition to
the @a=@t terms in (16); fourth, substitute the FOC w.r.t. T into the other using (18), and divide
throughout by ￿A. Relative to the standard procedure, the only unusual step is the second; and
of course the extra-terms that originate from the derivatives w.r.t. the lower limit of integration in
(16), re￿ ecting the endogeneity of the tax basis, must be accounted for. A few ￿nal manipulations
yield the following generalisation of the many-person Ramsey tax rule:12
t = ￿
A￿(1 ￿ rG) ￿
R y+





@t (y)f (y)dy ￿ a(y)f (y)
￿ ; (21)
where the superscript h denotes the hicksian demand, and r = cov(g (y);a(y)) + 1 is the so-called
redistributive characteristic of a, taking a value greater than unity when consumption decreases
with income and less that unity otherwise. Recall that the vector of tax rates is normalised, with
the rate on c arbitrarily chosen to be zero. Hence, to say that the tax rate on a is positive or
negative really means that the tax rate is larger or smaller than that on c; only statements about
relative tax rates make sense. The reader must keep this in mind in order to interpret correctly the
analysis that follows.
Notice ￿rst that the second term at the denominator represents the reduction of the tax basis due
to the very presence of the tax ￿the amount of consumption of the status goods that goes into the
black; the second and third term at the numerator represent instead the impact on the tax design of
overconsumption and of the endogenous reduction of the number of tax-payers, respectively. Taking
away these three terms, one would recover the standard rule, where the nature of the tax depends
exclusively on r, weighed by the average of the marginal utility of income among the tax-payers.
The ￿rst term at the denominator of (21) includes the substitution e⁄ect of the tax, and thus
represents the e¢ ciency concerns relative to the standard distortionary impact of the tax itself;
as for the second term, it has been just mentioned that it represents an additional, non-standard,
distortionary e⁄ect (a tax basis reduction e⁄ect). The denominator is certainly negative, since
@ah=@t < 0, while a(y)f (y) > 0; also, the larger it is in absolute value, the smaller in absolute
value must be t.
Given that the denominator is negative, t has the same sign as the numerator. So, for example,
12Since there is only one taxed good, the result is expressed directly in terms of the tax rate; with many goods, it
should have been framed in terms of e⁄ects on the compensated demand for each good.
14assume that r is signi￿cantly less than unity because the consumption of a, that is after all a luxury
good, increases sharply with income;13 consider that the second term always tends to make the
numerator positive because a￿ (y) < a(y) for all y; suppose ￿nally that w(y)V ￿ (y), representing
the welfare loss due to the disappearance of a fraction of the indirect tax-payers, is not large enough
to compensate the other two elements. Under these conditions, the numerator of (21) is positive,
and so is t.
If that is the case, the status good must be taxed more heavily than the general consumption
good because it is prevalently consumed by the rich (equity concern, represented by r) and because
it is overconsumed by all those who actually purchase it due to the relative consumption e⁄ect.
The revenue from the taxation of the status good would ￿nance a lump-sum subsidy, T > 0.
However, there is no presumption that the taxation of the status good must be particularly heavy.
In fact, since the denominator includes two distortionary e⁄ects (see above), and the third term at
the numerator partially compensates the ￿rst two, a relatively lenient taxation of the status good
might be called for at the optimum.
Summing up, the tax rule for status goods in the presence of counterfeited products must strike
a compromise among di⁄erent concerns. The consumption externality reinforces the tendency
to taxation implied by the luxurious nature of the good; the endogenous selection of tax-payers,
however, limits the extent to which this taxation may be applied, strengthening the action of the
substitution e⁄ect. The combined e⁄ect is most likely to yield a mildly progressive tax system. The
taxation of the luxury goods, that hits exclusively the middle- to high-income agents (those above
y), allows to establish a lump-sum subsidy in favour of all agents; therefore, the middle- to low-
income agents (those below y) obtain resources from the tax system without actually contributing
to it. This is the progressive element of the tax system. However, since the presence of the black
market makes the tax highly distortionary, its revenue is likely to be small: which is why I spoke
of "mild " progressivity.
This result makes it possible to assess whether the markets for counterfeited luxury goods
actually play a redistributive role. On the one hand, they make a cheaper alternative to the
original articles available, but on the other hand they signi￿cantly limit the redistributive role of
the tax system. At the theoretical level, it is impossible to ascertain which of the two forces is
prevalent in practice, but it cannot be excluded that the second more than compensates the ￿rst.
13The average social net marginal utility of income not likely to a⁄ect much the computations, as we assumed that
g is decreasing in income (see fn. 11).
15It is thus conceivable that the net redistributive e⁄ect of the presence of shadow market is negative.
By reducing the equity content of the optimal tax structure, it might undo the favourable impact
in terms of availability of a⁄ordable status-signalling goods.
In this respect, enforcement of the rules against the illegal trade of fake fashion items might
in principle help the tax system to become more e⁄ective in pursuing its equality objectives. But,
while it is clear that a complete eradication of the black market would do the trick, it is less clear
how an intermediate step could be helpful. For suppose that the enforcement action lowers the
threshold income from. If there are many more agent clustered at the new, lower, income level than
at the previous one, and if the reduction of per-capita consumption of a is not particularly large,
then aggregate consumption at the threshold income might actually be larger after the enforcement
e⁄ort, and the tax basis reduction e⁄ect might actually call for a lower tax rate. In turn, this might
induce a smaller total revenue ￿without forgetting the extra-expenditure on enforcement. At this
level of generality, it is obviously impossible to reach precise conclusions, but the message is clear:
it cannot be known a priori whether stepping up the enforcement activities is always a good idea,
because the e⁄ects at the margin are indeterminate, and there is a non-negligible risk of actually
reducing the progressivity of the tax system. The issue should be solved empirically.
Political economy
After investigating the normative side of taxation, it might be of some interest to complete the
analysis by taking a positive standpoint. The standard approach would be to invoke the median
voter theorem within a Downsian model of political competition where the candidates are o¢ ce-
motivated and can credibly commit to policies before the election; in this case, a simple majority
voting procedure is enough to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. It is however necessary
to verify if the conditions for its applicability hold.
As a preliminary remark, let me emphasize that the policy that emerges at the political equi-
librium ignores the externality issues, and only concentrates on the black market ones. Of the
two main peculiarities of status goods that we identi￿ed at the beginning of the paper, and that
a⁄ected together the normative results, only one remains relevant in the positive setting. In the
voting process, the agent do not take into account the need to correct for the overconsumption of
the status good, that is after all something they do not perceive as a problem by assumption; they
still act on the basis of their own limited point of view, not that of the omniscient planner. From
that limited point of view, only the change in the tax basis due to the tax rate a⁄ects the agent￿ s
16calculations.
For the purpose of this subsection, it is convenient to further simplify the framework by taking
the utility function to be quasilinear in the standard consumption good c. The main consequence
of this is that the marginal utility of income is constant and normalised to unity; all our result are
readily generalizable to a standard decreasing marginal utility, but the intuition behind them is
much better conveyed in the simpli￿ed setting.
Let us then derive the policy preferences of the agents: using (7), but recalling that VT = WT = 1




= 0; y < y (t); ￿
Vt
VT
= a; y ￿ y (t); (22)
where the ￿rst result follows because those who purchase the status good on the black market pay
no indirect tax, and therefore there is no substitutability between the policy instruments. For the
median-voter equilibrium to exist with certainty, it must be the case that this marginal rate of






> 0; y ￿ y (t): (23)
where the sign follows from normality of a. For all agents with income below y; the marginal rate
of substitution is of course constant: they all agree, as we shall see, on the same preferred policy.
The conditions for the median-voter theorem to hold are thus satis￿ed.
The next step is to emphasise that from the government budget constraint we can express T as
a function of t,
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where the identity follows from (19); recall that @A=@t, representing the total distortionary e⁄ect
of the tax, is negative. Normally, the revenue curve in the (t;T)-space is assumed to be strictly
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14The monotonicity of the marginal rate of substitution between policy tools is equivalent to the so-called "single-
crossing" of the indi⁄erence curves in the policy space. Gans and Smart (1996) have proven that single-crossing
ensures the existence of the median-voter equilibrium.
17where the term on the l.h.s. is the absolute value of a generalised revenue elasticity that accounts
also for the change in the tax base. The sign of T00 depends on the second derivatives of the
demand function, and therefore, at this level of generality, must be assumed to be negative so as
to guarantee strict concavity.
By substituting the expression for T(t) into the indirect utility functions (6) and taking the
derivative w.r.t. t, it is possible to identify the ideal tax rate t(y). This solves









; y ￿ y (t): (29)
The interpretation is very simple. All those who purchase the status good on the black market agree
on the same preferred tax rate, that must be positive and indeed as large as possible, i.e. set at the
level where revenue is maximised (T0 = 0). This way, they will enjoy the largest possible amount
of redistribution in their favour: they do not pay any indirect tax, but receive the maximum poll-
subsidy. The tax preferences of those who purchase the status good on the legal market depend on
how much they consume. Those who consume more than the average (a(y) > A) favour a subsidy
(t < 0), those who consume less than the average (a(y) < A) favour a tax (t > 0). This is a
standard result in political economy models, although here it is slightly modi￿ed because it doesn￿ t
apply to the whole population, but only to those who make legal purchases.15
The winning policy is determined by where the median income lies on the income distribution.
The standard assumption is, as virtually true everywhere, that the median income is less than
the average income. In our case, this has di⁄erent implications depending on whether the median
income earner makes his or her purchases of the status good on the black market or on the legal
market. In the ￿rst case, the winning policy implies a revenue-maximising t. In the second case,
the most likely outcome is that this agent is one of those who purchase less than A: since the
group of those who buy a is made by relatively high earners, the average quantity of a consumed
is probably more than the quantity consumed by the agent with mean income, and therefore also
more than the quantity consumed by the median income agent.
15Alternatively, we may say that it applies to the whole population with the proviso that all agents with income
less than y are bunched at the same preferred policy. In fact, the ideal t for them can be derived by setting a(y) = 0
in (29).
18Thus, we may generally expect that the status good will be taxed at the political equilibrium.
If the black market is particularly well developed, and a large fraction of the population make their
purchases there, then the implemented tax rate might even be the one that maximises revenue.
There will therefore be a certain amount of redistribution, and this vindicates somehow the claim
that illegal markets of the sort described here can favour the less well-o⁄. Since this is especially true
when the black market is large, the argument also establishes a case against the active enforcement of
the rules on a political economy basis, and is consistent with the observation that the general public
seems uninterested, if not actively contrary, to the eradication of black markets for counterfeited
status goods. In any event, it must be remembered, that if the tax rate is highly distortionary, be
that because the substitution e⁄ect is large or because the tax base loss is signi￿cant or both, then
the revenue-maximising t is not necessarily very large.
The interesting question is however whether the tax rate emerging at the political equilibrium
is above its e¢ cient level ￿e¢ cient in the sense that would be chosen by an utilitarian planner,
taking into account also the consumption externality. Such a tax rate can be derived from the
formulation (21), obtained in the previous subsection, by simply setting the weights w(y) = 1 for
all y. At ￿rst sight, a comparison between the e¢ cient tax rate as given by (21) thus modi￿ed, and
the political equilibrium tax rate is di¢ cult. For the case in which the median voter is among those
who purchase on the black market, it is however possible to conclude that the latter exceeds the
former. The welfare-maximising tax rate can, as is well-known, also be found via a dual problem:
maximising revenue subject to a given social welfare level. This compares to the unconstrained
optimisation that constitutes the median voter problem as a constrained optimisation with the
same maximand. The tax rate that solves the constrained problem must therefore be smaller than
the one that solves the free problem, as long as the constraint bites (and the optimum is on the
upward-sloping part of the La⁄er curve). Then, the winning tax rate is ine¢ ciently large.
V. Concluding remarks
Previous results on ￿scal policy in the presence of status-carrying goods agree on the conclusion
that, from the point of view of social welfare maximisation, there is no strong case for taxing
them particularly heavily (Corneo and Jeanne 1996, Micheletto 2009). The present contribution
expands on those works in that it considers explicitly the possibility that the status-signalling goods
may be purchased on illegal markets; it thus recognises the enormous importance of fakes in this
context, emphasising that it is the very nature of status goods that incentivates the formation of
19the illegal markets. In fact, since these goods have only or mostly a signalling value, they can be
easily counterfeited by making objects that have a similar appearance. This paper also considers a
wider array of policy situations than previous works: not only the design of indirect redistributive
taxation, but also that of corrective taxation, and the formation of equilibrium indirect tax policies
via a political process.
The analysis con￿rms that the case for heavy taxation of status goods is not particularly com-
pelling in a social welfare maximisation context, by o⁄ering further arguments against it. On the
one hand, it is true that the overconsumption typically associated with the status-signalling nature
of the goods in question calls for a high tax rate; but on the other hand, it must be recognised
that such a tax rate is strongly distortionary, not only in standard substitution terms e⁄ects, but
also, as it is highlighted in the present formulation, because it favours the enlargement of the black
market and a consequent loss of tax basis. The optimal tax rate resulting from these competing
claims needs not be particularly large. In turn, this makes it di¢ cult to give to the tax system a
strongly progressive shape; doubts are therefore cast on the usual statement that the presence of
fakes acts as a redistributive instrument by making cheap alternatives available. It is true that low
earners can in this case a⁄ord status goods that would have been otherwise unreachable, but it is
also true that the illegal market hampers the equity-enhancing action of the tax system.
Also, the analysis breaks new ground by noticing that corrective taxation, aimed at remedying
the ine¢ ciencies associated with the consumption externalities generated by the status goods, is
made by and large ine⁄ective by the presence of a market for fakes. The corrective tax induces
those who stay legal to consume e¢ ciently, but increases the number of those who go black, who
continue to overconsume.
Finally, political processes are studied in the context of a simple median voter model. It is found
that this model predicts a relatively heavy tax rate on status goods, especially in the presence of
a large illegal markets. If the median voter makes her purchases illegally, she is not hit by the tax
on the legally traded status-goods but at the same time enjoys the fruits of its revenue; she will
therefore favour a revenue-maximising tax rate, that can be shown to be ine¢ ciently large. This
result goes some way towards explaining why in the history of the ￿scal systems heavy indirect tax
rates on luxury goods are often encountered, despite the fact that they are, normatively speaking,
inadvisable. The contrast between the social welfare analysis and the political economy analysis is
of some interest.
Finally, a few comments are o⁄ered, throughout the analysis, on the opportunity of enforcing
20policy actions against the illegal market. It is noted that, while a complete eradication would
be useful as far as welfare-maximising tax policy is concerned, a partial elimination would not
necessarily help. From a positive standpoint, it is unlikely that these actions receive a signi￿cant
support, because the tax structure favoured by the median voter relies exactly on the presence of
the black market.
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